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Lecture
THE SEEGERS LECTURE
THE DECLINE OF TRIALS IN A LEGALIZING
SOCIETY
Marc Galanter*
ABSTRACT
Outcomes determined by trials have been a steadily declining
portion of case dispositions in American courts for more than
half a century; and for the past quarter century, trials in those
courts have been declining in absolute numbers. Although
there are differences in detail, the trend line is clear—the trial
is declining as the thing—indeed the central, defining,
characteristic thing that our courts do. The departure of trials
is mourned by some judges, practitioners, and academics but is
celebrated by others. The rarity of trials remains hidden from
many by their robust media presence. This Article juxtaposes
the decline of trials to changes in the role and shape of law in
American society and to the continuing increase of laws,
regulations, lawyers, and litigation.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an observer of the American legal scene, I am struck by how much
it has changed since I got out of law school more than half a century ago.
Do not worry—I am not going to harangue you about how things were
better in the good old days. I would like to take this opportunity to
examine some prominent changes in our legal system. As we attend to
our daily round, we may live through immense changes and fail to see
how dramatic they are. Arriving at a place that was literally unimaginable
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a few decades earlier, we may reflect on how limited is our ability to
envision the future.
I begin with a puzzle. We can observe what appears to be a pervasive
legalization of American life.1 I recognize that “legalization” is an
ambiguous term. It is one of those curious words—like sanction—that
have meanings that seem contradictory.
Legalization can mean something is no longer illegal—in other words,
an activity is “legalized” when it is removed from being sanctioned,
punished, or forbidden by law (e.g., legalization of marijuana, abortion, or
interracial marriage). But, “legalization” can also mean subjecting
something to more legal regulation, for example, child care, or,
prospectively, marijuana. As its use is decriminalized, a whole new set of
regulations will emerge about its production, adulteration, sale, use by
minors, use by drivers, and so forth. The net result, we might expect, will
not be less regulation, but more—though hopefully less violent,
destructive, and costly than the earlier regulatory regime. Similarly samesex marriage is becoming legalized in both senses. It is no longer
forbidden, but it promises to be increasingly regulated—not least in
opening the door to same-sex divorce, an expedient that will entail
navigating more regulation rather than just moving out.2
In addition to some dramatic instances of legalization in the first
(permission) sense, our society is becoming legalized in the second
(regulation) sense.3 There are more rules, more lawyers, and more
spending on the legal. Indeed, if we take the presence of lawyers and the
spending on them as rough indicators of legalization, we may chart a
dramatic legalization of American society over the past half-century.4 It
is not that legalization began only in the last fifty years, but just to focus
on a convenient chunk, I propose to get at the matter by comparing some
features of the current legal scene with their precursors of twenty-five
years ago and twenty-five years before that. I take 2010 (which for
convenience I am declaring to be the present for the purposes of this
See David L. Chambers, The “Legalization” of the Family: Toward a Policy of Supportive
Neutrality, 18 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 805, 805 (1984–1985) (explaining multiple meanings of
the term).
2
See SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 86–87 (2009) (detailing
the decline in regulation forbidding public display of what was thought to be gruesome
disabilities). Can something be legalized in sense one but not in sense two? Yes, when the
state withdraws from forbidding something, without imposing new regulations on it, as in
the abandonment of bans on interracial marriage.
3
See Chambers, supra note 1, at 805 (defining legislation and the two definitions
referenced above).
4
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 482 (2004) (showing evidence of the
legalization of society).
1
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Article) and look twenty-five years earlier to 1985 and twenty-five years
before that to 1960. To trace these connections, I present, in summary
form, some data about changes in legal institutions and their setting. I
hope, by this exercise, to suggest the change in scale, structure, and texture
of the legal world, and to provide some sense of the direction and pace of
change. Then, I speculate about possible connections between those
changes and the decline of trials. Of course, changes in the frequency of
trials began before 1960, but the changes since then are sufficiently
dramatic that I hope you indulge me in this foreshortening.5
II. THE CHANGING LEGAL SETTING
How can we measure the presence of regulation? A useful first
approximation is to count the lawyers.6 We find a very significant increase
in the number of lawyers over the course of our period. Even fifty years
ago, the United States had more lawyers per capita than any other
country.7 Since then, lawyers and their ratio to national populations have
increased just about everywhere, which suggests that the legalization we

Federal court data from 1961 onward is readily comparable with current data and this
commends 1961 as a convenient place to begin observations.
6
In some societies, this might not be as useful an indicator of legalization because of large
numbers of nominal lawyers who are not occupationally engaged in legal work. However,
in the United States the correlation between bar membership and legal work is sufficiently
strong to provide a useful indicator.
7
See Marc Galanter, More Lawyers Than People: The Global Multiplication of Legal
Professionals, in RICHARD ABEL ET AL., THE PARADOX OF PROFESSIONALISM: LAWYERS AND THE
POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 72 (Scott Cummings ed. 2011) [hereinafter Global Multiplication]
(demonstrating that the United States had the most lawyers than any other country).
5
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find in the United States is not peculiar or unusual, but very much the way
things are heading more generally.
The number of lawyers has grown faster than the population. In 1960,
there was one lawyer for every 631 persons in the United States. 8 That
increased to one lawyer for every 363 persons in 1985 and one for every
258 in 2010.9 Over this fifty-year period, the presence of lawyers grew
about two and a half times as fast as the underlying population.
Moreover, when we talk about the presence of lawyers, we have to
consider the changing technologies they wield. A lawyer practicing in
1900 would have found little that was strange or baffling in the technology
of a 1960 law office. That 1960 office was not notably different from an
office at the beginning of the twentieth century when elevators,
telephones, and stenography had transformed the law office from an allmale preserve, in which partners were outnumbered by troops of
messengers and copyists.10 By 1900, vastly multiplied shelves of printed
material (copious law reports, digests, citators, and legal encyclopedias)
displaced less systematic resorts to researching and finding cases and
treatises.11 A time traveling visitor from the early twentieth century
would have found little that was surprising in the law office of 1960.
This long period of technological calm ended abruptly with an
unbroken and mushrooming succession of innovations—photocopying,
facsimile machines, office computers, CD-ROMs, online data services,
overnight delivery, e-mail, cell phones, laptops, smart phones, access to
the World Wide Web, “the Cloud”—bringing changes in the legal practice,
like electronic filing and electronic discovery, as well as nationwide and
worldwide firms.
These new technologies enable these more numerous lawyers to
produce more product—whatever it is that lawyers produce.12 Some part
of their product consists of dealing with regulation—producing it,
analyzing it, invoking it, conforming to it, and working around it. Thus,
it seems fair to assume the increase in the number of lawyers signifies, and
in part results from, the presence of more regulatory activity.
Unsurprisingly, spending on legal services, which is basically
spending on lawyers, consumes a larger portion of our swelling national

See id. at 73 (presenting an example of the lawyer data).
See id. (providing an instance of the lawyer data from 2010).
10
See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:
THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 7–8 (1991) (describing the transformation of law
offices).
11
See id. at 8–9 (transforming the new tools and style of legal research).
12
See id. at 7 (addressing the increase in lawyer productivity).
8
9
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product, doubling from 0.59% in 1960 to 1.17% in 1985 and continuing its
vigorous growth to 1.60% by 2010, as shown in Figure 2.13

The legalization suggested by these “lawyer” measures are confirmed
by a comparable increase in the quantity of federal regulations deposited
in the federal register.14 The 82,000 pages added in 2010 was almost six
times the number of pages added back in 1960.15 This growth was
displayed under all administrations. The Federal Register is used as a
convenient indicator—not a measure—of the span of the regulatory sea in
which all these lawyers are swimming.

13
See Bureau of Econ. Analysis: Gross-Domestic-Product-(GDP)-By-Industry Data: Value
Added, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. (2016), http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm
[https://perma.cc/7K5R-9HUS] (attributing the increase of lawyers to the increase of
regulatory activities); see also GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 10, at 40 (providing the data on
the legal services increase).
14
See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 10, at 40–41 (concluding that legal services continue
to increase with regulations and services provided).
15
See Federal Register Pages Published 1936–2015, U.S. OFF. OF FED. REG. (2015),
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2016/05/pagesPublished2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q2DS-VV7T].
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Finally, as a rough measure of the presence of rules, investment in
enforcement activity, and coercive deployment of legal sanctions, Figure
4 shows the number of persons confined in prison or jail in each of our
years, rising from some 332,000 in 1960 to 474,000 in 1985, surging to a
staggering 1.6 million in 2010—an increase of even greater scale than the
massive increases in lawyers and expenditures on law.16

16
See Office of Justice Programs, Key Statistics: Prisoners, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (2014),
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=kfdetail&iid=488
[https://perma.cc/Z3QL-BVCZ]
(explaining the increase of prison and jail inmates); see also The Punishing Decade: Prison and
Jail Estimates at the Millennium, JUST. POL’Y INST. (2000), http://www.justicepolicy.org/
images/upload/00-05_rep_punishingdecade_ac.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K5K7-8YEG]
(demonstrating the increase of prisoners under state and federal jurisdiction).
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III. THE DECLINE AND DISPLACEMENT OF THE TRIAL
So we have lawyers and rules—and prisoners—all present in greatly
increased quantities. At the same time, one emblematic, and supposedly
central legal institution—the trial—is not present in increased quantity.
Instead, its presence is shrinking. Back in 1936, not long before the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, around eighteen
percent of all civil cases in the federal courts ended up in trial. 17 In 1963,
some twenty-five years after enactment of the federal rules, 11.5 percent
of the civil cases disposed of in the federal courts reached trial. 18 Now,
trials are just a bit more than one percent of civil cases.19
A similar decline started a few years later on the criminal side. 20 The
percentage of convicted persons whose conviction involved a trial fell
dramatically after 1980, as shown in Figure 5.21 Litigation data from the
See Stephen Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L.
REV. 631, 633 n.3 (1994) (providing civil trial rates over time).
18
See Galanter, supra note 4, at 459 (showing the decrease of trials after the federal rules
were created). The Administrative Office of the federal courts counts as a trial “a contested
proceeding at which evidence is introduced.” Id. at 461. In classifying terminations, the
record-keeping category is cases terminated “during or after trial.” Id. at 475. Thus, the
reported number of trials includes a considerable fraction that settle during trial. The
definition of trial in the state courts is more varied, so the numbers are not strictly
comparable. Id. at 475–76.
19
See id. at 492 (presenting the current civil trial statistics).
20
See id. at 493, 495 n.70 (explaining that there was also a decrease of criminal trials).
21
See Galanter, supra note 4, at 493, 495 n.70 (addressing that the Sentencing Reform Act
affected the amount of criminal trials).
17
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state courts are less abundant and less readily comparable. The first
reliable figures, for a large contingent of states, are from the mid-1970s.22
The National Center for State Courts assembled data on civil trials in the
general jurisdiction courts of twenty-two states from 1976–2002.23 During
that period of rising caseloads, the number of jury trials decreased by
thirty-two percent, and bench trials (which were far more numerous)
decreased by seven percent.24 Subsequently, the Center was able to
assemble data for fifteen states for the period 1976–2009.25 These figures
also show a declining portion of trials, both jury and bench, of comparable
magnitude to that in the federal courts.26
In state courts and federal courts, there has been a long, slow, but
steady decline in the percentage of cases that were tried.27 While virtually
everything else in the legal system continues to grow, the number of trials
is shrinking not just as a percentage of dispositions, but since the mid-1980s,
shrinking absolutely, as well.28 How can we reconcile the dramatic decline
of trials with the increases of laws, regulations, lawyers, spending on law,
and imposition of punishment?29 This decline is not reflected in popular
culture where the trial remains a robust presence. 30
That the occurrence of trials has undergone a severe decline is now
widely known—at least in legal circles. To summarize roughly: trials
See Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976–2002, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 758 (2004) (demonstrating the beginning of record collections).
23
See id. at 756, 760 (comparing the data collection process from state versus federal court).
24
See id. at 769.
25
See Paula Hannaford-Agor, Measuring the Cost of Civil Litigation: Findings from a Survey
of Trial Lawyers, VOIR DIRE 22, 28 n.2 (2013), http://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/micro
sites/civil-justice-initiative/home/~/media/1393b815d5d547ca8690d1b0ee596431.ashx
[https://perma.cc/PFP4-VY3U] (generalizing data over a period of time).
26
See Ostrom et al., supra note 22, at 764 (addressing the general decrease of trials
throughout the nation).
27
See id. at 769 (explaining that bench trials consistently declined).
28
See Galanter, supra note 4, at 516 (examining the decline of cases that go to trial).
29
See id. at 459 (presenting that the decline, noted earlier by several observers, was
identified as a major concern by the Conference on the Vanishing Trial, sponsored by the
Litigation Section of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), held in San Francisco,
California, in December 2003). The studies presented at that conference can be found in
Volume 1, No. 3 of the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, dated November 2004. See generally
Yeazell, supra note 17, at 633 (identifying observers who discerned the vanishing trial
phenomenon avant le lettre); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts
in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1997) (showing the decrease in trials
and the increase in settlements); Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial
Courts?, 55 S. M.U. L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2002) (generalizing the decline of trials in the United
States); Hope Viner Sanborn, The Vanishing Trial, 88 A.B.A. J. 24, 26 (2002) (citing to Galanter’s
research and the conclusion that trials are decreasing even at the state level).
30
See David Ray Papke, The American Courtroom Trial: Pop Culture, Courthouse Realities,
and the Dream World of Justice, 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 919, 926 (1999) (commenting on the numerous
depictions of trials in television shows).
22
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have been a steadily declining portion of dispositions for more than half a
century. For the past quarter century, trials have also been declining in
absolute numbers. There are differences in detail from place to place,
court to court, and topic to topic. But, if we step back, the general trend
line is apparent: the trial, once the central, defining, characteristic thing
that our courts do, is diminishing. The departure of trials is mourned by
many: judges, practitioners, and academics.31 Yet, the same turn away
from trials to alternative processes is celebrated by other academics. 32
Judges advise us to submit to the inevitable. 33 Practitioners and parties,
voting with their feet so to speak, have increasingly avoided the trial
mode.34 The diminution of trials remains something of a shock, since the
trial is close to the symbolic core of our legal system. 35 It is enshrined in
everyday expressions (“the jury is still out on that,” “a jury of one’s peers,”
“one’s day in court”) and widespread lay expectations. 36 The rarity of
trials, now something like one percent of dispositions in federal courts and
similarly diminished in state courts, remains hidden from the wider
public by news reports, Judge Judy, and fictional portrayals of trials in the
media.37 The trend lines, as far as they can be discerned, are on a
continuing downward course, although the absolute decline is getting
smaller and less regular because there is not that much space for further
decline.38
The general dimensions of the decline are displayed in the following
graphs:
See generally ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 88 (2009) (analyzing
the decline of trials); William J. Young, An Open Letter to the U.S. District Judges, 50 FED. LAW.
30, 31 (2003) (stating the decline of civil and criminal trials in state and federal courts);
Higginbotham, supra note 29, at 1045 (commenting on the decrease of trials); David J. Beck,
A Civil Justice System with No Trials, TEX. B.J. 1073, 1073 (2003) (discussing the decrease of trials
throughout the United States); Stephan Landsman, So What? Possible Implications of the
Vanishing Trial Phenomenon, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973, 973 (2004) (suggesting that the
lack of jury trials will have significant impacts in our legal system).
32
See generally D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 453,
459 (2007) (addressing the alternatives from court); Blake D. Morant, The Declining Prevalence
of Trials as a Dispute Resolution Device: Implications for the Academy, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1123, 1125 (2012) (presenting reasons why settlements are beneficial).
33
See Hornby, supra note 32, at 455 (articulating the encouragement of settlement); see also
Morant, supra note 32, at 1127 (suggesting that settlement conferences can be useful to settle
disputes).
34
See Hornby, supra note 32, at 455 (concluding that many litigants choose settlements
over trials).
35
See Morant, supra note 32, at 1128–29 (generalizing why trials have not become as
frequently used).
36
See Hornby, supra note 32, at 455 (acknowledging that some litigants still want juries).
37
See Galanter & Palay, supra note 10, at 518 (stating that many citizens are unaware of
the low percentage of trials).
38
Id. at 459.
31
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Fig. 5-Civil and Criminal Trial Rates in U.S. District Courts, 1962–2012

Fig. 6-Number of Civil Trials in Courts of General Jurisdiction in Sample
of Seventy-Five Most Populous Counties

These figures represent the decline. There are differences in timing
and scale from court to court, but the cumulative evidence of a similar
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diminishment of trials suggests they are manifestations of the same, or
comparable, underlying factors.
I would like to mention one more time series of trials that, so far as I
am aware, is the longest available run of comparable data about trials.
Peter Murray assembled figures on civil trials in the Massachusetts courts
at five year intervals from 1925 to 2000.39 Back in 1925, each of the thirtytwo Massachusetts Superior Court judges conducted an average of ninetyfour trials.40 These were trials that went to verdict, not just trials that
began, which is presumably a larger number (I mention this because the
federal count is of trials begun). By 2000, those thirty-two Massachusetts
Superior Court judges had grown to eighty-two.41 The average number of
trials conducted by each of these eighty-two judges was seven.42 Where
there were over 3000 (3022) trials 75 years earlier, there are now some 571
trials.43 When we adjust for population growth, the contrast is even more
striking.44 The population of Massachusetts grew from roughly 4 million
in 1925 to roughly 6 million in 2000; the frequency of trials per 100,000
residents dropped from 75 to 9.45
Murray’s data not only displays the dramatic change in the output of
the courts, but points to how different the job of the contemporary judge
is, compared to his or her predecessors.46 “The jury trial activity,” Murray
observes:
that was the daily routine of judges in the first quarter of
the 20th century has become rather exceptional for their
counterparts at the beginning of the 21st century. . . . [B]y
comparison with previous generations, lawyers and
judges of today are living a legal culture in which trial by
jury is more a legend than a reality.47
I want to emphasize what this long-term decline of trials is not. It does
not mark a decline of legal regulation; nor does it mark a decline in resort
to law by claimants or rulers; nor does it mark a decrease in conflict and
See Peter L. Murray, The Disappearing Massachusetts Civil Jury Trial, 83 MASS. L. REV. 51,
53, 55 (2004) (listing the number of jury trials in Massachusetts from 1925 to 2000).
40
Id. at 55.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 53.
44
See id. at 58 (commenting that civil trials, due to a decrease in jury duty participation,
have ceased to be a major part of civic life of Massachusetts citizens).
45
Murray, supra note 39, at 58.
46
See id. at 56 (noting that work as a trial judge differs markedly from the beginning of
Murray’s data set to the present).
47
Id. at 56, 60.
39
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contest.48 On the contrary, we see more regulation, more claiming, and
more contest.49 For example, the legalization of marijuana and the
policing of child care each brings in its train a whole new set of regulations
and enforcement practices, and perhaps new frontiers of liability. But we
may well get all those “mores” without getting more trials in our courts.50
Before we examine the wider setting of this decline of court trials,
recall that in addition to trials in governmental institutions, like courts,
there are a considerably larger number of trial-like proceedings located in
other governmental institutions that are not part of the judicial branch. 51
At the federal level, these range from Immigration Courts to the Board of
Veterans Appeals to the Social Security Administration.52 In 2010, when
the federal courts held trials in fewer than 14,000 cases, the Immigration
Courts heard 122,465 cases with representation and 164,742 without, the
Board of Veterans Appeals heard over 13,000 cases, and the Social Security
Administration’s Office of Disability Adjudication and Review heard over
700,000.53 There is a lot of adjudication going on, but it occurs in
institutions that enjoy a less distinguished ceremonial pedigree than
courts—absent the robes, elevated benches, honorific titles, deferential
retainers, and the distinctive etiquette that distinguishes a court from
more pedestrian decision-making bodies. 54 These boards, commissions,
tribunals, “Office ofs,” and some even called courts, enjoy none of the
institutional charisma that attaches to “real” courts, staffed by
ceremonially complete enrobed judges (who are a shrinking portion of the
total number of government judges, and an even smaller fraction of all
who play the role of third-party).55 This includes the growing band of
48
See Scott Brister, Decline in Jury Trials: What Would Wal-Mart Do?, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 191,
191–92 (2005) (describing a rise in legal, non-courtroom proceedings); Richard E. Levy &
Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 473,
474 (2002) (attributing the rise of trial to administrative law, based on the history of the New
Deal and the rise of administrative agencies that exercised trial functions to administer
growing regulatory regimes).
49
See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 48, at 476–77 (discussing the rise of regulatory bodies
that exercise court-like functions).
50
See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Trials and Tribulations of Counting “Trials,” 62 DEPAUL L. REV.
415, 441 (2012) (removing trials is one of the many cost-saving measures).
51
See id. at 427 (providing that the federal system denotes as trial any “contested hearing
where evidence is presented”).
52
See id. at 428 (articulating the various administrative agencies that conduct trials).
53
Id. at 428.
54
Id. at 436–37; see also Oscar G. Chase & Jonathon Thong, Judging Judges: The Effect of
Courtroom Ceremony on Participant Evaluation of Process Fairness-Related Factors, 24 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 221, 222 (2012) (stating that the robes and courtroom are imposing to amplify the
authority of judgment).
55
See Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations
on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 941, 982 (1999) (describing the
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arbitrators, mediators, and other “neutrals” as well, and the decisionmakers that preside in an array of forums within institutions from
universities to organized sports.56
Trends in the occurrence of trials—if that is what we wish to call
them—in these “non-capital-C-court” settings remain largely
unexplored.57 There is little reason to assume there is a caseload shrinkage
comparable to that in the “real” courts.58 It is quite possible that the
caseload, power, and finality of some or many of these forums is
growing.59 Yet, whatever is happening in them remains largely invisible,
not only to the wider public, but to all but a tiny fraction of the legal
community.60 Indeed, their low visibility is part of their appeal to certain
users.61 Typically, there is no audience at these “trials” and media reports
are few.62 Again, beyond these less august and less visible areas of
litigation in governmental forums, there is adjudication in arbitrations and
in a variety of private courts/tribunals.63 This whole sector of legal
activity, governmental and non-governmental, enjoys very little public

proliferation of dispute resolution forums, which do not vindicate formal rights as a
traditional court does); Owen McGivern, The Decline of the Judiciary, 61 N.Y. ST. B.J. 14, 16
(1989) (considering the loss of judicial importance and replacement of judges with
technocrats).
56
See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 55, at 982 (articulating the limitations of arbitration
forums that limit the aggrieved’s power, replacing vindication of rights with protection of
the organization); McGivern, supra note 55, at 16 (exploring the rise of administrative
technocrats displacing judges).
57
See generally Levy & Shapiro, supra note 48, at 476 (reflecting on administrative bodies
reducing the number of cases brought to court, and raising the question of the number of
disputes that are siphoned off from the judicial system to alternative fora).
58
See id. at 476–77 (outlining that administrative agencies have superior capacity to
address specialized matters than the courts).
59
See Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for Arbitration: The Growing Market for
Evaluative Mediation, and What it Means for the ADR Field, 3 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. 111, 129 (2002)
(indicating a growth in ADR); see also Levy & Shapiro, supra note 48, at 476–77 (providing
that administrative agencies can relieve the caseload of the judicial system).
60
See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 55, at 982 (remarking on the invisibility of
administrative non-court proceedings).
61
See id. at 973 (discussing the example of private security as something that can constrain
political rights while it remains invisible to societal watchdogs guarding against such
encroachment); see also Victor G. Rosenblum, Low Visibility Decision-Making by Administrative
Agencies: The Problem of Radio Spectrum Allocation, 18 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 19 (1965) (displaying
a lack of visibility to the public as a threat to democracy).
62
See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 55, at 973 (remarking on invisibility to civil liberties
watchdog organizations).
63
See supra note 55; see also Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B. U. L.
REV. 1101, 1137 (2006) (relating the lack of media presence at alternative tribunals and ADR
proceedings).
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visibility or academic scrutiny.64 I think it is fair to say that these trials
rarely figure in any public discourse about legal norms or practices.
IV. STORIES OF CHANGE
In brief, the story is that trials in our courts have declined, while
society and its economy, the legal profession, and virtually all things legal,
continue to grow.65 I do not propose to argue whether we should celebrate
or deplore the decline and diffusion of the trial. It would, I think, be
surprising if this one element of our legal system has undergone profound
change all by itself while everything else in the legal world went on as
before.66 My goal here is to see what other changes are occurring and to
ask how the decline of trials is related to these other developments. How
is the decline connected, specifically, to changes in the judiciary and the
legal profession, and more generally, to changes in the shape and role of
law in our society?
Let me briefly point to a few of the changes in the legal profession. As
noted earlier, there is striking growth in numbers of lawyers. 67 Lawyers,
not all of them, but many more than earlier, are practicing in much larger
units, in firms that are organized in a pyramid of partners and associates,
although that is now undergoing dramatic change. 68 The profession is
increasingly stratified, with those who represent individuals practicing in
smaller units with less income and less prestige than those who represent
corporate or governmental entities—and it is the latter who are
consuming an ever-growing share of the legal service pie.69
What else has changed that might explain, or be explained by, the
decline/demise of court trials? There are a number of competing but
intertwined stories. Each has its adherents on the bench and in the
academy, although in the heat of the moment’s demands, actors may
switch from one to another. Here is my list of frequently proffered

64
See Edelman & Suchman, supra note 55, at 982 (remarking less visible dispute
resolutions forums).
65
See supra Figures 1–6 (illustrating an increase in lawyers and legal services while civil
and criminal trials decrease).
66
See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have all the Trials Gone—Settlements, Nontrial
Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 729–33 (2004) (describing the drop in federal civil trials).
67
See supra Figure 1 (showing growth in the number of lawyers).
68
See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament:
A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. 1867, 1926 (2008) (noting changes in the major
law firm structure); Milton C. Regan, Taking Law Firms Seriously, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155,
157 (2002) (providing the rise of larger firms).
69
See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR
315–320 (2005) (articulating the increasing stratification of lawyers).
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accounts of the change: (A) the “better technology of fact finding” story;
(B) the “changing judicial ideology” story (i.e., our job is settlement); (C)
the “avoiding judicial overreach” story (i.e., let’s not exceed our
role/competence); (D) the “fighting frivolous cases” story; and (E) the
“ADR is better” story.
A. The “Better Technology of Fact-Finding” Story
Professor John Langbein argues that the common law trial is a weak
and costly fact-finding device.70 Once extensive discovery became
available, it effectively displaced the inefficient and expensive trial. This
appealing explanation encounters a number of puzzles, some more
challenging than others. Why is the trial-suppressing effect of discovery
continuing to increase after almost eighty years?71 How does it work in
the majority of cases in which there is little or no discovery? 72 Why have
some matters proven increasingly resistant to the lure of settlement?
For example, medical malpractice trials seem to flourish less because
of the problem of obtaining information, rather than because of the high
stakes for doctors.73 And why do automobile accidents remain the most
trial-prone case type (see Figure 6 above) in spite of the typical sharing of
information?74 And how can we account for the comparable decrease of
trials in other common law jurisdictions like England and Australia less
favored with generous provisions for pre-trial discovery?75
B. The Changing Judicial Ideology Story
Another take on the demise of trials is that it results from a marked
change in the ideology of judges. 76 Between 1960 and 1985, during our
first period, there was a pronounced shift in the judicial view of the
See John Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L. J. 522,
526 (2012) (arguing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which enable generous
discovery, resulted in increased settlement, displacing the trial).
71
See supra Figures 5–6 (showing a constant decrease in civil trials).
72
See Langbein, supra note 70, at 547 (citing multiple authors to show that a majority of
cases engage in little discovery).
73
See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice and Compensation in Global
Perspective: How Does the U.S. Do It?, 87 CHI. KENT L. REV. 163, 195 (2012) (stating medical
malpractice suits are risky, even though doctors tend to win).
74
See supra Figure 6 (illustrating that the rate of trials related to automobile injuries
remains high compared to other subject matter areas).
75
See Sally Lloyd-Bostock & Cheryl Thomas, Decline of the “Little Parliament”: Juries and
Jury Reform in England and Wales, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 13 (1999) (noting the decline of
civil trials in England and Wales); see also Murray, supra note 39, at 55–61 (providing the
decline of civil trials in Australia and Canada).
76
See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261,
1267 (2010) (referring to the rise of the managerial judge as a change of judicial ideology).
70
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function of courts.77 There were always some judges who were known for
pressuring parties to settle.78 But the generally accepted view was that
settlement was “a desirable by-product” of the push toward trial.79
In the federal district courts in the 1960s, almost half the cases filed
went away without any judicial action, presumably settled on their own
or abandoned.80 However, increasingly, judges saw settlement as more
than a by-product of their efforts to move cases toward trial, but as close
to the heart of their job description. 81 By the late 1970s, a benign and
approving view of negotiation was the received wisdom among many
prominent judges.82 Chief Judge Hubert Will of the Northern District of
Illinois, a favorite speaker at the Federal Judicial Center’s workshop for
new judges counseled that “[o]ne of the fundamental principles of judicial
administration is that, in most cases, the absolute result of a trial is not as
high a quality of justice as is the freely negotiated, give a little, take a little
settlement.”83 The next two stories converge on the goals of curbing
excessive litigation and judicial overreach.
C. Recoil Against Demands for an Inappropriately Enlarged Judicial Role
In a third story, courts regard themselves as overwhelmed by requests
for action beyond their competence and proper scope. An example would
be the recoil from such an enlarged judicial role promoted by Chief Justice
Warren Burger in the 1970s with the support of a significant segment of

See id. (noting the Resnik dating of the start of the managerial judge phenomenon).
See Steven Baicker-McKee, Reconceptualizing Managerial Judges, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 353,
386 (2015) (commenting on coercive procedural tactics within a judge’s discretion which can
coerce a settlement); Marc Galanter, “. . . A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge:” Judicial
Mediation in the United States, 12 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 5 (1985) [hereinafter Galanter, Judicial
Mediation] (recounting two examples of judges forcing a settlement based on their position
and knowledge of the parties’ offers); Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator
in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257, 261 (1986) [hereinafter Galanter, Judge as Mediator] (noting
settlement is the default position for judges).
79
Galanter, Judge as Mediator, supra note 78, at 261.
80
See Galanter, Judicial Mediation, supra note 78, at 1–4 (noting the low percentage of cases
going to trial); see also Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don’t Know (and Think We Know) about our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 4, 37 (1983) (noting the large number of filings resulting in few trials and the low
number of judge terminated lawsuits).
81
See Galanter, Judicial Mediation, supra note 78, at 2 (recounting the change of how views
of settlement changed).
82
See id. (charting the view that arranging settlements was the accepted job of a judge in
the pre-trial phase of litigation).
83
Hubert L. Will, The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.D.R. 89, 89 (1976).
77
78
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the legal elite.84 Concerned that too much was being asked of the courts,
the Chief Justice launched an exercise to institute a “better way” to resolve
disputes—a way that involved less legal contest and fewer trials. 85
D. The “Fighting Frivolous Cases” Story
A different version of “asking too much of the courts” flourished in
conservative quarters. The “battle against frivolous cases” story centers
around the victimization of defendants or potential defendants, by claims
seen as frivolous, cumulating in a litigation explosion in which predatory
lawyers, supine or misguided judges, and biased juries give excessive
awards to undeserving claimants. 86 This perspective is dramatized, and
fossilized, in a continuing campaign by the United States Chamber of
Commerce to identify and publicize “judicial hellholes.” 87 This effort
reflects widespread sentiment in the business community. John Lande
found that “almost three quarters of the [business] executives (70%) [that
he interviewed] thought that more than half of such cases [were] so
frivolous” that they should never have been brought. 88
E. The “ADR is Better” Story
Another strand in this recoil against litigation was the rise of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”); a set of practices earlier thought
appropriate for resolving small cases or disputes within circles of those
who repeatedly dealt with one another was transformed into a battery of
techniques for extending access to justice, and for some proponents, an

See Marc Galanter, The Turn against Law: The Recoil against Expanding Accountability, 81
TEX. L. REV. 285, 293 (2002) [hereinafter Galanter, Expanding Accountability] (recounting that
Chief Justice Warren Burger and others recoiled against a high level of litigation).
85
See Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 276 (1982) (noting a
“better way” to deal with mushrooming caseloads).
86
See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends about the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 717 (1998) (naming the disillusionment of the justice system a
jaundiced view); see generally Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts, 15
JUDGES’ J. 43 (1976) (discussing excessive demands on courts); Erin Schiller & Jeffrey A.
Wertkin, Note, Frivolous Filings and Vexatious Litigation, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 909, 930
(2000) (commenting on the problem of frivolous lawsuits).
87
See Thornburg, supra note 76, at 1097–98 (noting the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s views
on litigation); but see Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey:
Inaccurate, Unfair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969, 970 (2009) (detailing
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s faulty methodology).
88
John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation—A Survey of Business Lawyers’ and Executives’
Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 26 (1998).
84
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elixir for delivering results superior to trial. 89 The institutionalization of
this perspective is neatly marked by the changing name of the ABA body,
created in 1977 as the Special Committee on Resolution of Minor Disputes,
which in 1987 became the Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution and
finally, in 1993, the Section on Dispute Resolution. 90
Starting in the 1970s, ADR gained new visibility and respectability.91
Professor Frank Sander’s presentation to Chief Justice Burger’s Pound
Conference in 1976 marks the arrival of ADR as a favored project of the
legal establishment.92 Support from the Ford and Hewlett Foundations
and promotion by President Jimmy Carter’s Department of Justice was
soon followed by the emergence of ADR practitioners as a group claiming
professional status.93 The movement of ADR from periphery to center was
accompanied by a growing acceptance that there should be a variety of
institutions to handle disputes in different modalities—an idea that
reached its apotheosis in the project of the “multi-door courthouse,”
which would, it was claimed, “match the forum to the fuss.” 94
But beneath the rhetoric of voluntarism, agreement was in many
instances forced on claimants, frequently with provisions that reduced the
potential for systemic relief, rather than individual redress.95 In response,
lawyers frequently approach such provisions tactically, not as liberation
from adversary combat, but as a different field of battle.96

See Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability, 37 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 115, 120–21 (2010) [hereinafter Galanter, Social Capability] (describing claims that
would extend access to justice).
90
See Jack Watson, ADR in Georgia, 30 GA. ST. B. J. 74, 75 (1993) (illustrating the history of
the ABA committee and the dates of the various name changes).
91
See Galanter, Expanding Accountability, supra note 84, at 289–91 (recounting Alternative
Dispute Resolution’s (“ADR’s”) other support); Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74
U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 334–36 (2005) (recalling the history of Chief Burger’s Pound Conference
and the major speech given by Professor Sander regarding ADR).
92
See Main, supra note 91, at 334–36.
93
See Galanter, Expanding Accountability, supra note 84, at 289–91 (recounting ADR’s gain
in respectability); see also Galanter, Social Culpability, supra note 90, at 120–21 (describing the
promise of ADR).
94
See generally Frank A. E. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 49 (1994) (discussing a wide
palate of ADR options).
95
See Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed
Monster or Two Sides of the Coin, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 1 (1993) (noting the involuntary ADR
problem with coercion); Rodney S. Webb, Court-Annexed “ADR”—A Dissent, 70 N.D. L. REV.
229, 232 (1994) (highlighting the flaws in ADR, especially problems of power relationships
and unequal power).
96
Jennifer W. Reynolds, Games, Dystopia, and ADR, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON D. 477, 529 (2012)
(noting the movement of adversarial views from courtrooms to ADR processes, creating a
dystopian hunger game rather than living up to the more utopian views of ADR).
89
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V. CONCLUSION: A NEW ERA?
The changes we observe are striking in view of the extraordinary
prominence of courts in American life and with our reliance on litigation
as an instrument of governance.97 Courts enjoy a special legitimacy that
seems resistant to widespread appreciation that they are inescapably
political institutions. What we see is not less regard for courts or less
recourse to courts—but a shift in their mode of operation. Trials have
fallen away, but more cases are processed in court. In place of the trial
there is an array of negotiated outcomes. Where the court does impose an
outcome, it is more likely to be a summary judgment or the result of low
visibility (and typically unreviewable) procedural rulings.
Trial is largely relegated to less prestigious administrative and private
forums—away from the courts with all their symbolic trappings,
institutional charisma, and public visibility. These non-court trials have
little or no public visibility. If some of these proceedings have some
demonstration effect going forward, there is likely to be little in the way
of addition to the publicly accessible body of precedent or learning.
For claims remaining in the courts, the prospects for trial are on a
downward spiral, as lawyers, unaccustomed to its demands and risks,
prefer the safety of settlement with the added attraction of being able to
tell the client when a good outcome was achieved.
At the same time, there is no reason to think that the outpouring of
new rules will abate. As regulation proliferates, so do discretion and
pockets of uncertainty. Parties who can afford to invest in favorable legal
outcomes will continue to do so. Winning is still the name of the game, as
the late Melvin Belli used to say, but winning these days hardly ever
involves a trial. Trials will surely remain with us, but whether they will
regain their centrality to the judicial process remains to be seen.

See Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S.,
PRINCETON U. PRESS (2010) (relying on private litigation to effectuate policy); Robert A.
Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government: The American Way of Law, HARV. U.
PRESS (2001) (discussing the prevalence of litigation as tool of governance in United States).
97
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